6 research outputs found

    Address spreading in future Internet supporting both the unlinkability of communication relations and the filtering of non legitimate traffic

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    The rotation of identifiers is a common security mechanism to protect telecommunication; one example is the frequency hopping in wireless communication, used against interception, radio jamming and interferences. In this thesis, we extend this rotation concept to the Internet. We use the large IPv6 address space to build pseudo-random sequences of IPv6 addresses, known only by senders and receivers. The sequences are used to periodically generate new identifiers, each of them being ephemeral. It provides a new solution to identify a flow of data, packets not following the sequence of addresses will be rejected. We called this technique “address spreading”. Since the attackers cannot guess the next addresses, it is no longer possible to inject packets. The real IPv6 addresses are obfuscated, protecting against targeted attacks and against identification of the computer sending a flow of data. We have not modified the routing part of IPv6 addresses, so the spreading can be easily deployed on the Internet. The “address spreading” needs a synchronization between devices, and it has to take care of latency in the network. Otherwise, the identification will reject the packets (false positive detection). We evaluate this risk with a theoretical estimation of packet loss and by running tests on the Internet. We propose a solution to provide a synchronization between devices. Since the address spreading cannot be deployed without cooperation of end networks, we propose to use ephemeral addresses. Such addresses have a lifetime limited to the communication lifetime between two devices. The ephemeral addresses are based on a cooperation between end devices, they add a tag to each flow of packets, and an intermediate device on the path of the communication, which obfuscates the real address of data flows. The tagging is based on the Flow Label field of IPv6 packets. We propose an evaluation of the current implementations on common operating systems. We fixed on the Linux Kernel behaviours not following the current standards, and bugs on the TCP stack for flow labels. We also provide new features like reading the incoming flow labels and reflecting the flow labels on a socket

    Erlang-based dimensioning for IPv4 Address+Port translation

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    International audienceAs the IPv4 address pool is being exhausted, it becomes urgent to find a way to migrate IPv4 network architectures to IPv6, or to reduce the use of IPv4 addresses. In this paper, we discuss a strategy known as ''Address + Port'' translation, which consists in several users sharing the same IPv4 address and being distinguished by a range of port numbers. Of critical importance for the feasibility of such a mechanism is the knowledge of the minimum number of ports to allocate to users so that no service degradation is perceived. To that extent, we analyse the port consumption of the most port-consuming Internet applications, web browsing, and present some aggregate port consumption curves for the student population of our campus. Our results suggest that a port range of 1000 ports is totally transparent to users (which would allow to share a single IPv4 address among 64 users),while 400 ports (i.e., 150 users per address) is sufficient for most of users. Finally, the number of users per address could be further improved by benefiting from statistical multiplexing, i.e., using dynamical instead of fixed port range allocation

    Address spreading in future Internet supporting both the unlinkability of communication relations and the filtering of non legitimate traffic

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    The rotation of identifiers is a common security mechanism to protect telecommunication; one example is the frequency hopping in wireless communication, used against interception, radio jamming and interferences. In this thesis, we extend this rotation concept to the Internet. We use the large IPv6 address space to build pseudo-random sequences of IPv6 addresses, known only by senders and receivers. The sequences are used to periodically generate new identifiers, each of them being ephemeral. It provides a new solution to identify a flow of data, packets not following the sequence of addresses will be rejected. We called this technique “address spreading”. Since the attackers cannot guess the next addresses, it is no longer possible to inject packets. The real IPv6 addresses are obfuscated, protecting against targeted attacks and against identification of the computer sending a flow of data. We have not modified the routing part of IPv6 addresses, so the spreading can be easily deployed on the Internet. The “address spreading” needs a synchronization between devices, and it has to take care of latency in the network. Otherwise, the identification will reject the packets (false positive detection). We evaluate this risk with a theoretical estimation of packet loss and by running tests on the Internet. We propose a solution to provide a synchronization between devices. Since the address spreading cannot be deployed without cooperation of end networks, we propose to use ephemeral addresses. Such addresses have a lifetime limited to the communication lifetime between two devices. The ephemeral addresses are based on a cooperation between end devices, they add a tag to each flow of packets, and an intermediate device on the path of the communication, which obfuscates the real address of data flows. The tagging is based on the Flow Label field of IPv6 packets. We propose an evaluation of the current implementations on common operating systems. We fixed on the Linux Kernel behaviours not following the current standards, and bugs on the TCP stack for flow labels. We also provide new features like reading the incoming flow labels and reflecting the flow labels on a socket

    New IPv6 Identification Paradigm: Spreading of Addresses Over Time

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    International audienceThe identification of packet flows is a very important feature to provide security on the Internet. This flow identification is traditionally done by the well-know five tuple source IP address, destination IP address, transport layer protocol number and the two source/destination identifiers of transport layer protocols (named ports on UDP and TCP). Unfortunately, the IP source address is not reliable at all. However, we can use new security paradigms based on new IPv6 properties. In particular, IPv6 introduces a large address space. Our solution takes the benefit of this space with a high frequency rotation of IP addresses, that we call spreading. This spreading improves the security since only the sender and the receiver are able to generate and follow this temporal sequence. An attacker will not be able to successfully insert malicious packets into a flow or to initialize a flow. It protects against session initialization flooding and against attacks on established connections. In this paper, we describe the architecture of our solution and the protocol to initiate a connection and also performance evaluation of our spreading

    IPv6 address obfuscation by intermediate middlebox in coordination with connected devices

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    International audiencePrivacy is a major concern on the current Internet, but transport mechanisms like IPv4 and more specifically IPv6 do not offer the necessary protection to users. However, the IPv6 address size allows designing privacy mechanisms impossible in IPv4. Nevertheless existing solutions like Privacy Extensions are not optimal, still only one address is in use for several communications over time. And it does not offer control of the network by the administrator (end devices use randomly generated addresses). Our IPv6 privacy proposal uses ephemeral addresses outside the trusted network but stable addresses inside the local network, allowing the control of the local network security by the administrator. Our solution is based on new opportunities of IPv6: a large address space and a new flow label field. In combination with Cryptographically Generated Addresses, we can provide protection against spoofing on the local network and enhanced privacy for Internet communication
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